My new favorite punching bag, Paul Edwards, claims in his book that reincarnation implies the strongest form of dualism (between mind and body) and since dualism is philosophically untenable, reincarnation is out the window! Ironically, Buddhism teaches that dualism is ultimately incorrect, that all concepts including those of self and other are empty of inherent existence. When we look at a chair, can we find any existence beyond that which is imputed onto it by our own mind? I think Edwards would say yes. But then, in the absence of an observer, is it a chair any more? Doesn't the concept of chair bring with it all sorts of assumptions that only make sense to a human? In fact, essentially tautologically, all we can ever know arises in dependence on conceptuality. The idea of a reality existing independent from us breaks down upon investigation. It is this way with everything. Our body, our mind and our self. None are seen to truly exist, except in dependence upon conceptuality. This may seem untenable or paradoxical, but is undeniably true, and its truth becomes clearer as you meditate and observe the way the mind works. Reincarnation is an example of "relative truth," a phenomenon that exists in the relative world of concepts, but according to "ultimate truth" does not actually exist. This is true of any concept. It vanishes when probed deeply enough.
So in Buddhism, dualism of any kind is found to be ultimately lacking in truth, but that is the way things appear to us. It is also said that we need to work within this relative framework to begin with (training wheels) in order to reach the level ultimate truth beyond concepts. Therefore, designations of "good" and "bad", "reincarnation" etc are provisionally helpful, but in the end it is all just the arising of mind.
I have personally come to the conclusion that there is an elephant in the room that many people miss when discussing cognitive science. It is often reduced to physical events such as neuron firings and neurotransmitters, but ignores the fact of first person experience. It is a commonly expressed view that consciousness is an epiphenomenon riding on top of a sufficiently complex system. In this view, first person experience (whatever that is!) automatically arises in any system capable of performing in the same complicated way as a human. To me this answers nothing. It doesn't explain what first person experience is, nor why it is forced to arise, when one could imagine a sufficiently complicated machine that has no corresponding first person experience. As I see it, there's a big mystery here.
Now Buddhism doesn't seek to reduce or explain this mystery. In fact, awareness is seen as inexpressible and inexplainable, the ground from which all arises.
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